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n the cold war between manufacturers and retailers, trade promotions
are viewed with great suspicion. Regardless of the terms of a given deal,
each party believes the other is trying to get the upper hand. The
watchword is trust, but verify.
In theory, trade promotions should benefit everyone involved. The manu-
facturer offers the retailer a product temporarily at a lower price; in return for
selling its goods at a lower unit cost, the manufacturer intends to earn new cus-
tomers and build the loyalty of current ones. Likewise, the retailer, by selling the
product at a discount, should enjoy increased sales during the promotion, while
bearing little in the way of extra costs. And consumers, of course, should save
money on their purchases. In practice, however, manufacturers and retailers
often manipulate the system in a zero-sum game, and consumers are sometimes
left out altogether.
It need not be that way. Over the past three years, we’ve examined the theo-
retical and practical problems associated with trade promotions, and we are
convinced that it is possible to create the right kind of deal — a transparent sys-
tem that generates mutual trust and, yes, produces the proverbial win-win out-
come for both manufacturers and retailers. The key is proper implementation
of what is thus far a little understood tool.
As most marketing managers know, the most common form of trade pro-
motion is the “off invoice,” so called because retailers see the savings immedi-
ately reflected in their invoices. Retailers frequently abuse these promotions,
however. They often purchase much more than they can sell during the official
promotion period and then either continue to sell discounted products for far
longer than the manufacturer had desired — thus eroding the brand’s equity —
or re-establish the product’s regular price and simply pocket the savings them-
selves. They frequently also sell some of their discounted excess inventory to
other retailers at a smaller discount, a practice known as diverting.
Increasingly, manufacturers, having wised up to these tactics, are testing
another approach: the pay-for-performance trade promotion. Pay for perfor-
mance means that retailers get rewarded according to how much they sell, not
how much they buy. Because the promotion results are usually determined by
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I
examining scanner data,
these promotions are called
“scan backs.” And yet scan
backs so far are unpopular,
too. Retailers are accus-
tomed to living off the fat of
the off-invoice promotion,
and they aren’t about to
welcome a change in the
status quo in the absence of
a persuasive argument to do
so. The fact is, although
scan-back promotions have been theoretically possible for a
couple of decades, they have not been tried often enough to
make their merits widely known. The often acrimonious rela-
tionship between retailers and manufacturers makes it difficult
for each party to assess the alternatives objectively. Suspicion
rules, and questions remain unanswered: Will a move to pay for
performance hurt retailers? What type of deal should they
accept? Will manufacturers be better off? What are the potential
pitfalls? How will consumers be affected?
We’ve found some answers to these questions. They come via
a relatively simple process that manufacturers can use to design
scan backs so that they will be acceptable to retailers. Using a
hypothetical case, we show how different scan-back options can
be designed to make them as attractive as off-invoice deals; we
also explain how one national beverage company made a scan
back work in practice. We then offer practical advice to help
senior managers overcome obstacles in implementing pay-for-
performance deals.
Let’s be clear: Pay-for-performance promotions are not a
magic pill that can cure everything amiss between retailers and
manufacturers. Nor are they an instant solution; they require
careful design and real changes in marketing culture. When
implemented correctly, however, they’re an important step in
the right direction. They boost manufacturers’ bottom line.
They do the same for retailers, while allowing them to concen-
trate on marketing rather than buying. They can increase trust.
And the consumer, who should be at the center of promotional
efforts, sees lower prices on trusted brands.
Seeds of Mistrust
For many companies, the trade deal is closer to being a bitter pill
than a miracle drug. In fact, trade promotion is the most expen-
sive, most controversial and least understood marketing tool
employed by manufacturers.1 According to one survey, manu-
facturers believe that only 16% of all trade deals are ultimately
profitable.2 Retailers, too, feel that such promotions are wasteful;
they claim that just 13% of the $75 billion spent annually on
these deals goes to their bottom line (manufacturers counter
that the figure is closer to 30%).3 Some of that money goes to its
intended recipient, the consumer; retailers express frustration
that the rest is eaten up in inventory costs and administrative
expenses. Moreover, two-thirds of retailers believe they are not
getting their fair share of trade promotion dollars; they suspect
that manufacturers are favoring their competitors.
But while retailers are often merely frustrated by trade pro-
motions, manufacturers generally loathe them in their current
form. Durk Jaeger, the former head of Procter & Gamble’s U.S.
operations, speaks for roughly 90% of all manufacturers in call-
ing the trade promotion system “impossibly inefficient.”4 In
addition, 85% feel that promotion dollars are not spent effec-
tively, and only 19% think they get good value for their money.5
Although channel partnerships in recent years have streamlined
supply chain management and the transfer of information
between manufacturers and retailers, that collaborative spirit has
been missing from the practice of trade promotion.6
From the manufacturer’s point of view, retailers subvert the
intent behind trade promotions primarily by “forward-buying.”
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That is, in response to an open-ended trade deal — “Buy as much
of our product as you want over the next two weeks at this lower
price” — retailers load up on much more than they intend to sell
during that period. We’ve mentioned the consequences of this
practice: The retailer either pockets savings that were supposed to
end up in the consumer’s wallet or continues the promotion to
the point where it can erode the brand’s value. Such practices are
tremendously frustrating for manufacturers.7 Yet one can hardly
blame retailers; they are simply responding rationally to the
incentives provided to them under the terms of the deal. As long
as the inventory costs associated with buying excess products are
lower than the savings they can obtain by forward-buying dis-
counted goods, they would be foolish not to do it.
Another problem with forward-buying is that it distorts the
producer’s understanding of demand. The manufacturer
responds to the artificially large orders by overproducing, only
to find that retailers and consumers have plenty of product on
hand. The broad fluctuations in demand contribute to ineffi-
ciencies in the supply chain known as the “bullwhip effect.”8
Needless to say, manufacturing plants suffer when the size of
orders is unpredictable and inconsistent.
Given these problems, why do manufacturers initiate trade
deals? They do so for a variety of reasons. They may want to
counter the popularity of lower-priced store brands, for exam-
ple. They may wish to encourage retailers to pass discounts on to
consumers who are especially price sensitive.9 Sometimes they
simply have a lot of inventory that they need to pass down the
channel. At other times, they may hope to increase brand aware-
ness or get consumers to try their product once — so they’ll
come back for more later. All are sensible reasons. The key in this
process is shifting the terms of the promotions so that retailers
continue to benefit but not at the expense of manufacturers.
Redesigning the Trade Deal
Manufacturers pin their hopes in this area of marketing on scan
backs. The goal is to lift the dead weight from the channel — the
retailer costs associated with managing excess inventory as a
result of forward-buying and diverting — and to redistribute it
in the form of profits for both sides of the deal.
Scan-back promotions have a profound impact on how retail-
ers react to the incentives on the table. Because only the units sold
during the promotion lead to payment, retailers have no reason to
forward-buy. Similarly, they have no motivation to divert since
only the merchandise sold through the retailer’s scanners gets
counted under the promotion’s terms. Scan backs also eliminate
the temptation to keep running a promotion long after the manu-
facturer’s discount is available. Once it’s over, it’s over. Finally,
because scan backs force retailers to disclose their actual sales fig-
ures to manufacturers, they can help manufacturers monitor retail-
ers’ marketing efforts as well as real levels of consumer demand.
But retailers have no incentive to change the way they engage
in trade promotions. Despite their grumblings, off-invoice deals
are good deals for them. Forward-buying and diverting gener-
ate sizable profits, and preventing retailers from engaging in
either would drastically affect their bottom line. It’s that
straightforward. Meanwhile, a scan-back offer with the same
terms (identical wholesale price, discount and time frame) as an
off-invoice deal yields much less revenue and profit. So why
would any retailer want to accept a scan-back promotion?10
The quick answer is that no retailer ever would. As a result,
manufacturers have no choice but to change the terms of the
scan back if they are to persuade retailers to accept pay-for-
performance deals. They can alter the terms in several ways to
accomplish that goal.11
To think through the different options, imagine a channel in
which a manufacturer sells a good that costs $3.33 to produce.
Sales are made through a single retailer and the underlying
demand curve slopes downward (as prices rise, sales decrease).
Consumer sensitivity to price changes is represented by a con-
stant price elasticity of demand that we set at –3. Optimal retail
prices are determined by the classical markup rule from micro-
economics: Price = (average cost ✕ elasticity) ÷ (1 + elasticity).12
Using this rule, the manufacturer sets the wholesale cost at
$5.00, and the retailer sets the retail price at $7.50. Sales and
profits in the absence of any deal are shown in column one of
the table “A Comparison of Trade Deals.” Over the course of 10
weeks, retailer revenue is $888.89, of which $296.30 is profit;
manufacturer revenue is $592.59, of which $197.53 is profit.13
What happens when the manufacturer offers a trade deal? It
all depends on how the deal is structured.
Identical Deals Start by considering a promotion in which the
terms of the scan back are the same as those for the off-invoice
deal. The manufacturer offers the retailer a $1 trade deal good for
one week. In the off-invoice scenario, the retailer would see a $4
charge on the invoice for each unit of the product it purchases. For
reasons beyond the scope of this article, we can calculate that the
retailer would rationally forward-buy 4.57 weeks’ worth of the
product.14 The retailer would then run the promotion for 3.45
weeks and set the regular price at $7.38 and the promoted price  at
$6.26. Column two in the table shows that in comparison with no
trade deal at all, retailer profits would increase by more than 17%,
while manufacturer profits decrease by more than 20%.
Now use the same terms to change the deal to a scan back.
The retailer would set regular and promotion prices at $7.50
and $6.00 (see column three). Reaping the benefits of the 
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deal for only one week, the retailer would have no incentive to
forward-buy. Its revenues and profits would be higher than they
would have been in the absence of a deal, but the benefits would
be much smaller in comparison with the off-invoice promotion
— only about a 5% increase in profits. Given the extra work
involved to implement the promotion, it’s easy to see why retail-
ers are reluctant to accept such deals, especially given the clear
benefits of off-invoice promotions. Although the numbers look
quite favorable to the manufacturer, a deal that offers such mea-
ger benefits to retailers isn’t going to fly.
The Mimic Scan Back Fortunately, the problem is not insoluble. It’s
possible to redesign the scan back so that retailers do at least as
well as they would with an off-invoice deal. One way of doing
that is through what we call the mimic scan back, in which the
retailer’s average costs of promoted and nonpromoted goods are
identical to those it would incur in the off-invoice trade deal; as
a result, the prices offered to consumers and the promotion’s
length will be unchanged, and the retailer will be equally prof-
itable in either case. The manufacturer, on the other hand, will
do better because the retailer will avoid forward-buying.
In order for the numbers to work out identically for the
retailer under a mimic scan back, the manufacturer has to
change three parameters: the regular wholesale price, the length
of the deal and the depth (size) of the discount. The key insight
is that the length of the promotion must equal the optimal
length set by the retailer in an off-invoice deal — in this case,
that’s 3.45 weeks. Similarly, the wholesale price and the depth of
the discount must induce the retailer to set the same prices in
both cases so that consumers, in turn, see the same prices as they
would during an off-invoice deal and thus behave identically in
each situation. To get to those prices (regular price of $7.38 and
discounted price of $6.26 in column four), the manufacturer
must set the wholesale price at $4.92 and the discount at $0.74
per unit. With those terms, the retailer will make as much as it
would have in the off-invoice scenario, but the manufacturer will
do better. The retailer still makes a profit of $347.02, but manu-
facturer profits go up to $168.79 from $156.23.15
A Comparison of Trade Deals   
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Retailer’s promotion length
Retailer’s promotion price
Average weekly sales, 
in units
Manufacturers have a variety of different options when it comes to implementing trade deals, from the traditional off-invoice 
(discounts based on how much product is ordered) to the largely untested scan back (discounts given according to how much product is
sold). The table indicates through a hypothetical example how different terms of trade deals yield different revenue and profit figures for 
manufacturers and retailers. The goal is to design scan-back promotions so that all parties, including consumers, come out ahead.
No promotion
Same depth
(of discount) 
scan back
Mimic 
scan back
Basic 
scan backOff-invoice deal
Cost to retailer
(wholesale price 
per unit)
1 65432
Manufacturer’s trade deal
Depth of discount
Length of promotion
$5.00 $5.00 $5.00 $4.92 $5.00 $5.00 
$1.00 $1.00 $0.74 $1.96 $1.00
1 week 1 week 3.45 weeks 1 week 3.04 weeks
Regular price
Average weekly sales,
in units
$7.50 $7.38 $7.50 $7.38 $7.50 $7.50 
11.85 12.45 11.85 12.45 11.85 11.85
3.45 weeks 1 week 3.45 weeks 1 week 3.04 weeks
20.34 23.15 20.34 52.93 23.15
$6.26 $6.00 $6.26 $4.55 $6.00 
Total sales, in units,
over 10 weeks
Retailer revenue
Retailer profit
Manufacturer revenue
Manufacturer profit $197.53 $156.23 $193.21 $168.79 $162.05 $184.38
$592.59 $661.83 $625.93 $674.39 $694.04 $694.04
$296.30 $347.02 $312.96 $347.02 $347.02 $347.02
$888.89 $1,041.06 $938.89 $1,041.06 $1,041.06 $1,041.06
118.52 151.68 129.81 151.68 159.60 152.90
Same length 
(of promotion)  
scan back
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Scan-Back Variations While the mimic redesign makes the scan
back sufficiently attractive to the retailer, the manufacturer may
be reluctant to change all three parameters. For example, the
manufacturer may be concerned that relatively long promotions
erode brand equity. In our hypothetical case, the company could
view a promotion lasting 3.45 weeks as undesirable. Fortunately,
a different deal can be put on the table that will still allow both
parties to benefit (see column five). By increasing the size of the
discount from $1.00 to $1.96, the manufacturer can keep the
wholesale price constant and the deal length at one week.
Retailer revenue and profits (again, using our assumptions
about pricing behavior) would then be as high as they would
have been following an off-invoice promotion, and manufac-
turer numbers improve as well. Although the improvement may
seem inconsequential, the total benefits would be significant if
many retailers were targeted. In addition, the manufacturer
would benefit from lower administrative costs and from getting
a better read on consumer demand.
Other manufacturers may balk at offering a deep discount or
changing their basic wholesale prices. In that case, as column six
in the table indicates, it is not difficult to adjust the length of the
promotion so that it meets the retailer’s criteria while also ben-
efiting the manufacturer. The sole criterion, again, is that the
scan-back deal must leave the retailer as well off as it would have
been as the result of an off-invoice promotion.
That the manufacturer can redesign the scan-back deal to
make both parties better off is perhaps not that surprising. The
interesting twist is that the redesign will always require the
manufacturer to offer a deal that is better than the off-invoice
promotion. To be acceptable to retailers, the scan back must
offer some combination of a lower regular wholesale price, a
longer deal and a deeper discount.
Does It Really Work?
It’s always healthy to be skeptical of purely hypothetical data.
But we have evidence that the scan back works. A national-
brand beverage manufacturer recently implemented both off-
invoice and scan-back trade deals in a yearlong field test.16 The
study was conducted in cooperation with retailers in four
regions of the United States (Northeast, Southeast, and two
parts of California). The four retailers had in the past engaged
in successful cooperative marketing efforts with the manufac-
turer and were savvy enough to recognize the potential in pay-
for-performance deals.
Each retailer received up to four scan-back and four off-
invoice deals at different times over the year. The scan-back pro-
motions were offered at the regular wholesale price for the same
length of time as the off invoice. In order to make the two deals
equally attractive to the retailers, the scan back included a
deeper discount than the off invoice. In addition, the first round
of tests included only the most popular SKUs so that the retail-
ers would get the maximum bang from each promotional buck.
The results revealed the clear advantages of the scan back.
A detailed statistical analysis of the flow of shipments from
manufacturer to retailer showed that retailers loaded up when
offered an off-invoice deal but did not do so when offered a
scan back. Not surprisingly, the year-end figures on units
shipped and units sold also presented strong evidence of divert-
ing, likely in response to the off-invoice deals. The Southeast
and one California retailer both sold many more units than they
ordered during the year (15% and 335% more, respectively; in
raw numbers, about 8,000 and 20,000 more cases sold than
ordered). The other California retailer sold much less than it
ordered (20% fewer cases, or about 60,000 cases). Only the
Northeast retailer sold about as much as it ordered.
When using scan-back deals, however, the beverage company
found greater pass-through of discounts to consumers, limited
(if any) forward-buying and more stable retailer demand. For
most off-invoice deals, pass-through to the consumer is usually
between 20% and 30%. In this case, about 75% of the total spent
on the various deals ended up in consumers’ pockets. Even with
that percentage of the deal going to consumers, both the bever-
age company and the retailers enjoyed more direct and indirect
benefits using scan backs in place of off-invoice promotions.
The field experiment revealed that scan-back deals generate
more sales and marketing support from retailers. During the
scan-back promotions in this instance, a higher percentage of
the beverage volume was sold using such marketing tactics as
end-of-aisle displays, newspaper advertising and weekly flyers.
Another important benefit to both parties is that under pay-for-
performance deals, it is easier to calculate prices and pass-
through rates.17 Scan backs eliminate the purchasing distortions
inherent in off-invoice deals that prevent manufacturers from
assessing pass-through rates. The data coming out of pay-for-
performance promotions are greatly simplified and make it 
easier to assess a given deal’s effectiveness.
Finally, by encouraging retailers to focus on marketing
rather than purchasing, scan backs help align retailers with
what should be their core function in the channel. Retailers shift
some of their attention from the manufacturer to the ultimate
driver of the category, the consumer.
Today the beverage company is continuing to use both off-
invoice and scan-back promotions, but it is gradually shifting in
favor of the latter. The main barrier to greater implementation
— in this situation and in others like it — is retailer allegiance
to the status quo of off-invoice deals.
We’ve shown how pay-for-performance promotions can be
made acceptable to both sides. There are, however, obstacles to
implementation that go beyond a consideration of the num-
bers. To make scan backs a regular part of the marketing land-
scape, manufacturers and retailers must learn to trust each
other more, and retailers must recognize how their organiza-
tional culture and infrastructure perpetuate the status quo.
These barriers can be overcome only by introducing a mix of
technological and human changes.
Using an Auditor
Like it or not, retailers and manufacturers need each other in
order to achieve superior performance. If scan backs are to gain
increased acceptance, retailers will need more than a numerical
argument to reassure them that they will be as well off as they
would be under the terms of off-invoice deals. They also need to
be able to trust that they will be reimbursed in a timely manner
for items that are sold during the promotion; at present, they
may rightly fear that payment will be held up until the two par-
ties agree on what the data say about how many units were sold.
At the same time, manufacturers must be able to trust that they
are paying only for those items that are actually sold during the
promotion period.
A classic example of how this trust is violated is the so-
called “scam down,” in which the retailer manipulates the
number of sales during the scan-back period.18 We encoun-
tered one case in which a retailer repeatedly ran the same item
through the scanner in order to inflate the number of sales. In
the worst-case scenario, the manufacturer gives an off-invoice
deal to one retailer who then forward-buys and diverts to a sec-
ond retailer; that retailer then sells the same merchandise dur-
ing a scan-back period — thus the manufacturer ends up
giving the discount twice.
To help build trust into the relationship, manufacturers and
retailers should consider implementing pay-for-performance
deals with the help of a neutral auditor. An auditor can facili-
tate the execution of the trade deal by informing all the retail-
ers involved of the terms and timing of the promotion (a feat
of coordination many manufacturers would be glad to out-
source) and by verifying sales. Well-established auditors can
also promptly pay retailers for the discounts earned and later
collect from the manufacturer. Seasoned auditors will also
have the ability to cope with retailers of different sizes and
locations, with many different products and degrees of tech-
nological sophistication. Auditors should offer a menu of
options from which the retailer can choose. For example, a
retailer without a scanner system should still be able to partic-
ipate in scan-back deals by leaving a different kind of audit
trail. Thus instead of reviewing easily verifiable electronic
data, auditors may have to check shipment invoices manually.
Since checking such data can be time-consuming and lead to
figures that are not completely accurate, stores that do not
have scanners may receive, say, 70 cents on the dollar for the
trade promotion.19 Auditors must also have the ability to sup-
port deals that depend on the retailer hitting sales targets or
providing specific marketing support (or both). A retailer
meeting the manufacturer’s sales target may receive a lump-
sum payment for doing so; another retailer that runs concur-
rent displays may receive credits that can be cashed in later.
Pay-for-performance menus that cover a range of possibilities
offer considerable flexibility to both parties.
If the manufacturer decides to use an auditor, it should
involve retailers in the selection process rather than just present
them with a fait accompli. Before making the decision, both par-
ties should look for evidence of the auditor’s ability to compute
cost-volume projections, to cover all classes of trade, to follow
up with retailers to make sure they understand the promotion’s
terms, to provide status reports on participation, to pay within
one week of the expiration of the scan-back deal and to provide
reports and billing summaries, preferably at the level of the
SKU and individual retailer. In short, the auditor should do a
lot more than simply verify sales and make payments.
As honest brokers, auditors also help retailers by making it
clear that the playing field is level. In the traditional off-invoice
game, the manufacturer and the retailer negotiate directly, and
powerful retailers can often squeeze more out of the manufac-
turer than weaker companies can. When proposing a scan
back, however, the manufacturer can use an auditor to make a
general announcement to several retailers that basically says to
each one, “You pick the promotional weeks that are best for
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To make scan backs a regular part of the marketing landscape, 
manufacturers and retailers must learn to trust each other more. 
you and decide how you want to market the product, and we
will make sure you are paid promptly and in direct proportion
to your performance.” When the playing field is leveled in this
way, only those retailers that are savvy, well-run marketers will
realize the maximum benefits of trade promotions. There is
nothing to be gained by gaming the system.
Changing Organizational Culture 
Auditors can’t fix every problem associated with trade promo-
tions. Over time, retailers have built entire departments and infra-
structures aimed at efficient product buying. Companies reward
individual managers for making profitable “buys,” and they invest
large amounts of capital in extra warehouse space and trucking
operations. Given these facts, it’s clear that it will take time before
retailers are ready to alter their compensation structures and oper-
ations so that they emphasize selling rather than buying.
Manufacturers have their own problems to solve. They’ve
become mired in administrative tasks resulting from compli-
cated negotiations with multiple retailers, and because of
uncertainty over pass-through rates — which ultimately drive
sales — they haven’t approached trade promotions with the
necessary degree of effort and sophistication. Moreover, they
are stuck in a prisoner’s dilemma in which one manufacturer is
afraid to drop off-invoice deals because a competitor will con-
tinue to run them and take away business as a result (even
though the manufacturers would be able to force the retailers to
change if they both made the switch).
In a truly market-driven organization, retail managers would
be rewarded for verifiable promotional performance, not for the
amount of product purchased. Likewise, manufacturers need to
establish performance metrics for managers that are related to
product movement and profitability, not simply sales to retailers.
Collaborative partnerships take time to develop, and are
best started by small efforts to build credibility and mutual
understanding.20 One practical early step is to encourage
experimentation. Companies could follow the beverage man-
ufacturer’s example: Choose a limited number of SKUs and
run both off-invoice and scan-back deals at the same time in
markets that have historically shown similar levels of sales vol-
ume and consumer response. Alternatively, choose one retailer
to implement both deal types consecutively. If such initial
efforts are successful, there is almost no limit to the scope and
level of complexity of experiments that can be constructed.
The most important element of such experimentation is that
it requires the key parties to talk about what they hope to
accomplish with a particular trade deal. Afterward, they
should cooperate to analyze the results of the experiment, pos-
sibly in consultation with an auditor who has data from a
range of experiments.
Changes in organizational culture and incentive plans can
also be supported by tangible marketing initiatives. For exam-
ple, retail managers should have their compensation more
closely aligned with brand and category performance rather
than the profits made from smart buying decisions. This
approach could also be extended to incorporate customer satis-
faction metrics in which manufacturers contribute an evalua-
tion of the quality of the retailer-manufacturer relationship.
Although that suggestion may sound radical, several companies
have in fact incorporated such “softer” measures into sales force
compensation plans.21 
Finally, it’s useful to keep in mind that while software solu-
tions for merchandising-response analysis are important, they
are not nearly as critical as the attitudinal and organizational
changes required to view trade promotion in a new light. Unless
both manufacturers and retailers can develop closer relation-
ships and begin to understand their respective roles in the chan-
nel better, scan backs will be no more successful than off-invoice
deals in promoting efficient trade that benefits the consumer.
Seeking Peace — and Profits
Relations between manufacturers and retailers may never be
chummy, but they don’t have to be hostile. After all, both sides
have the same goal in mind: to sell as many products as they can
to customers.
The implementation of pay-for-performance trade promo-
tions can help achieve that goal. As we have shown, correctly
designed trade promotion schemes have the potential to pro-
duce many important benefits for all parties. Manufacturers can
have better assurances that their dollars will reach consumers.
Retailers do not need to worry that pay-for-performance 
is a rod for their backs — indeed, it can help them dramati-
cally cut costs and reorient their activities toward what should
be their core competencies, selling and marketing. That will
ultimately benefit consumers as the savings are passed down
the retail channel.
Companies that embark on this route can rest assured that it
has sound conceptual underpinnings, but they must recognize
and preempt the potential pitfalls. They must be willing to
experiment, collect data and, perhaps most important, cooper-
ate to deliver value to consumers.
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